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I. INTRODUCTION
During a routine gall bladder surgery, a physician negligently cut
his patient's common bile duct.' The patient soon commenced a medical
malpractice action against the physician to recover for her injuries.2
However, this physician had opted to "go bare"' as authorized by the
Florida Financial Responsibility statute section 458.320(5)(g). 4 On the
day the medical malpractice case went to the jury, the physician peti-
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2011, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2005, Boston College. I would like to thank my parents for their
unwavering support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Mary Coombs for
her insightful commentary and willingness to work with me throughout the writing of this article.
1. Sawczak v. Goldenberg (In re Goldenberg) (Goldenberg 1), 218 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.
2000), certifying question to 791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.), revisted by 253 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2001).
2. Sawczak v. Goldenberg (In re Goldenberg) (Goldenberg If), 253 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2001).
3. "Going bare" is the term used when a physician does not carry medical malpractice
liability insurance and is self-insured. Allen Kachalia, Niteesh K. Choudhry & David M. Studdert,
Physician Response to the Malpractice Crisis: From Defense to Offense, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
416, 419 (2005).
4. Goldenberg 1, 218 F.3d at 1264.
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tioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.' The injured patient had to file an
emergency motion for relief from automatic stay so that the delibera-
tions could proceed.6 Ultimately, the jury awarded the patient over $4
million in damages.'
The physician-debtor "filed bankruptcy schedules listing
$3,791,119 in assets, of which he claimed $3,751,678 as exempt" during
the bankruptcy proceeding.' The exempt assets comprised $355,894 in
unmatured annuity contracts and over $2.5 million in retirement funds.9
The bankruptcy court classified the $4 million judgment as an unsecured
debt"o and discharged it. As a result, the physician-debtor held on to his
almost $4 million in exempt assets, a portion of which was presumably
accrued through monies saved as a result of the physician-debtor not
having to pay any medical malpractice liability premiums. The injured
patient was left without remedy.
The essence of the physician-patient relationship is trust. A patient
trusts that his physician will properly diagnose and treat whatever ail-
ments may arise. A physician trusts that the patient will provide any
necessary information to make a proper diagnosis and will follow the
physician's prescribed course of treatment. Medical malpractice litiga-
tion arises when a patient feels that his physician has violated this very
trust," whether with an improper or delayed diagnosis, insufficient
informed consent, medical negligence, or even recklessness.
The Florida legislature embraced this framework of trust when it
implemented section 458.320(5)(g), permitting physicians to "go bare"
(self-insure) as long as they promised to pay any judgment against them
up to $250,000.12 Currently, over 10% of licensed physicians in the state
of Florida have opted to "go bare."" In effect, section 458.320(5)(g)
added another layer of trust to the physician-patient relationship. Now
patients must trust that, if the physician first violated their trust by com-
mitting medical malpractice, the physician either will have medical mal-




9. Goldenberg 1, 218 F.3d at 1266.
10. Tort judgments are classified as unsecured debts. Michelle J. White, Why It Pays To File
for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a
Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 687 (1998).
11. "Blackstone declared that [medical] malpractice was an offense because 'it breaks the
trust which the party placed in his physician."' KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 157 (1990).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g) (West 2004).
13. E-mail from Carla D. Ruiz, Management Analyst, Fla. Dept. of Health Div. of Med.
Quality Assurance, to author (Jan. 8, 2010, 10:22 EST) (on file with author).
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practice liability insurance or will stand by the promise to pay the
judgment.
The federal bankruptcy arena provides a useful lens through which
to evaluate section 458.320(5)(g) of the Florida Financial Responsibility
statute. The Florida Financial Responsibility statute coupled with the
federal Bankruptcy Code creates a loophole where physicians may "go
bare" conditioned on the promise to pay a judgment up to $250,000 yet
file for strategic bankruptcy and discharge any debts against them result-
ing from a finding of medical malpractice liability.14 Unlike the section
458.320(l)(c)15 requirement of an irrevocable line of credit or the sec-
tion 458.320(l)(a) 16  requirement of an escrow account, section
458.320(5)(g)(1) permits a physician to self-insure without any safety-
nets in the event that the physician cannot pay a medical malpractice
judgment." This is highly problematic for a meritorious plaintiff-
patient."
While the issue of self-insured physicians filing for bankruptcy to
discharge medical malpractice debts is not unique to the State of Flor-
ida,19 federal bankruptcy courts and appellate courts in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and the Florida Supreme Court systematically have interpreted the
language of the Florida Financial Responsibility statute in such a way as
to erode patients' rights.2 0 After describing the current law, this article
proposes a change in the law to preserve the right of a meritorious
patient-plaintiff to recover damages from a "bare" self-insured
physician.
In particular, the article will focus on the loophole created by the
14. See, e.g., Guerra v. Fernandez-Rocha (In re Femandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813 (11th Cir.
2006); Hanft v. Church (In re Hanft), 315 B.R. 617 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd, 73 F. App'x 387 (11th
Cir. 2003); In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006); Bakst v. Marks (In re Marks), 131
B.R. 220, 221 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that the physician-debtor used strategic bankruptcy to
prevent collection of state court awarded medical malpractice judgment). See generally Bob
LaMendola, Uninsured Doctors on the Rise in South Florida, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27,
2008, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/custom/consumer/sfl-flrxdocs0727sbjul27,0,19664
84.story (describing how physicians can "go bare" and then file for bankruptcy).
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(1)(c) (West 2004).
16. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(l)(a) (West 2004).
17. See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd., 959 So. 2d 176, 184 (Fla. 2007) (interpreting
section 458.320(5)(g) as an opt-out provision that waives the requirements of liability insurance,
escrow account, or letter of credit to satisfy financial responsibility).
18. See generally U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-702, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 40 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf (explaining how injured patients have difficulty
collecting judgments from self-insured physicians).
19. See, e.g., W.Va. Doctor Facing Malpractice Lawsuits Files for Bankruptcy, INS. J., Dec.
10, 2007, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast/2007/12/10/85509.htm.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
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intersection of the Florida statute on Financial Responsibility and bank-
ruptcy law as to permit doctors to shield themselves from personal lia-
bility entirely without being required to carry medical malpractice
insurance tethered to high premiums. Part II surveys the empirical data
on medical malpractice awards in Florida and nationally, as well as med-
ical malpractice liability insurance premiums in Florida. Part III pro-
vides some background on the legislative policy of section
458.320(5)(g) and a summary of relevant bankruptcy law. Part IV traces
the progression of the intertwining of bankruptcy and medical malprac-
tice cases. Part V of this article argues for the elimination of the loop-
hole created by section 458.320(5)(g) in the context of bankruptcy. In
this section, I propose that Congress should create a section 523(a)
exception to discharge that specifically targets this type of debt. I also
argue that the Florida State Legislature should repeal section
458.320(5)(g) in light of the other statutory provisions by which physi-
cians can satisfy financial responsibility. Finally, Part VI briefly
concludes.
II. DO THE DOLLARS MAKE SENSE?
Many approaches to reducing health care costs have placed too
much emphasis on medical malpractice liability costs as a major contrib-
utor.2 ' In reality, while national health care costs amount to trillions of
dollars every year,2 2 medical malpractice liability payouts in 2008 con-
stituted less than 2% of national health care expenses.2 3 In Florida,
approximately $298 million in medical malpractice claims were paid out
in 2004,24 which amounts to only .3% of total health care spending in
the state.2 5 When the cost of litigation is factored in, Florida medical
21. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: LIMITING TORT
LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2 (2004), http://www.alembik.com/Library/Objective%20
Study%20of%2OTort%20Reform%20by%20the%20CBO.pdf ("even large savings in premiums
can have only a small direct impact on health care spending-private or governmental-because
malpractice costs account for less than 2 percent of that spending"); MICHELLE M. MELLO, THE
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A
PRIMER 8-10 (2006), http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports-and-briefs/pdf/nolOprimer.pdf
(presenting empirical data that there was not a correlated increase in medical malpractice claims
and the rise in health care costs in the early part of the 21st century).
22. In 2008, United States spent over $2.3 trillion on heath care. Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, National Heath Expenditure Data, https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealth
ExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.asp (last visited July 25, 2010).
23. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 21.
24. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PAYMENTS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, 2004, http:/
/www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?yr- 14&typ=4&ind=437&cat=8&sub= 102 (last
visited July 25, 2010).
25. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FLORIDA: HEATH EXPENDITURES BY STATE OF RESIDENCE,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=5&sub=143&rgn=11 (last visited May 11,
2010). In 2004, Florida spent over $95 billion on heath care. Id.
236 [Vol. 65:233
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malpractice expenditures totaled $700 million in 2008.26 Using $700
million as the real costs for physicians, medical malpractice costs
account for .7% of health care spending in Florida.
A. The Reality of Medical Malpractice Claims in Florida
The reality of the medical malpractice litigation scene in Florida is
one with far fewer suits than imagined, and with many damage awards
well below the $250,000 liability insurance threshold.27 However,
despite the continuing decline of medical malpractice suits, the media
and physicians' interests groups continue to lobby for tort reform that
further limits an injured patient's paths to recovery. 28
From 2000-2004, Florida-based medical malpractice insurers
reported payouts in 8519 cases. 2 9 Of these 8519 cases in a five-year
span, only 5.5% resulted in payments over $1 million and 66.2% of the
claims were closed out for less than $250,000.30 The average insurance
payout from 2000-2004 was $133,000.
Of the 8519 cases, only 156, or less than 2%, actually made it to
jury verdict with a jury-determined damage award.3 2 The jury deter-
mined awards averaged $322,000-almost 2.4 times the average settle-
ment of $131,000.11 However, from 1990-2003, 93% of cases that
resulted in payouts over $1 million were the result of settlements, with
juries being responsible for only 7.5% of million-dollar awards. 34 Fur-
ther, when compared to a 2001 national survey, Florida's jury-deter-
26. FLA. OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2009), http://www.floir.
com/pdflMedicaMalReportlO012009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ANNUAL REPORT] (calculating Florida
insurance company medical malpractice liability expenditures at $700 million, which takes into
account the cost of litigation).
27. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcS SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Robert E. White, First Professionals Insurance Company Files for 8 Percent
Base Rate Decrease-Florida Doctors Begin to Reap the Benefits of Amendment 3, FLORIDA
OBSTETRIC AND GYNECOLOGICAL SOCIETY, http://www.flobgyn.org/socioeconomics/items/2135.
php (last visited May 11, 2010) (championing tort reform despite acknowledging that insurance
premiums are not reflecting the decrease in litigation). See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 18,
at 41; Kimberly Morrison, Tort Reform Complicates Health Care Debate, JACKSONVILLE Bus. J.,
Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.bizjoumals.com/jacksonville/stories/2009/09/07/story2.html (explaining
how tort reform falls on party lines).
29. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. Insurers in Florida are only required to report the
number of closed cases, and not the number of total cases filed. Id. See also Neil Vidmar et al.,
Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54
DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 332 (2005).
30. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 27; see also Vidmar et al., supra note 29.
31. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Vidmar et al., supra note 29.
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mined damage awards were approximately 25% below the 2001 national
average of $425,000.31
There was a record low number of claims paid in Florida in 2008.6
In 2008, there were 842 paid claims in Florida, with a mean average
payout of $278,620.37 The national mean average payout that year was
$326,992.38 In total, insurance companies in Florida paid out approxi-
mately $700 million for medical malpractice claims, $500 million of
which went directly to damage payouts. 3 9 However, decreased medical
malpractice litigation may not be proof that instances of medical mal-
practice have declined, as a famous Institute of Medicine study showed
that there are many more instances of medical malpractice than of
claims filed.4 0
B. Medical Malpractice Liability Insurance
In comparison to actual medical malpractice payouts by insurance
companies, insurance premiums for physicians and surgeons in Florida
remain quite high.4 1 For example, in 2009, the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists revealed that "[p]hysicians reported
spending an average of 18.0% of their gross income on liability insur-
ance premiums each year."4 2 The good news is that Florida has seen a
steady decline in premiums over the past few years .43 The 2007 premi-
35. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 27.
36. New Public Citizen Report: Medical Malpractice Payments Fall to Record Low, FLA.
JUSTICE Ass'N, July 16, 2009, http://www.floridajusticeassociation.org/inTheNews-detail.asp?ID
=146.
37. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FLORIDA: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, http://www.statehealth
facts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=8&sub=102&rgn=ll (last visited May 11, 2010) [hereinafter 2008
FLORIDA CLAIMS]. These numbers refer to paid claims against allopathic physicians, allopathic
interns and residents, osteopathic physicians, and osteopathic interns and residents.
38. Id.
39. 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 4. The $700 million includes claims against
physicians, as well as hospitals.
40. INST. oF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM I (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 1999); see, e.g., Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Florida's Comprehensive Medical
Malpractice Reform Act: Is It Time For A Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 552 (1996). But
see Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public On Medical Errors,
347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1933, 1944 (2002).
41. Jennifer Liberto, Lst Insurance "Fix" Hasn't Slashed Rates, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.sptimes.com/2007/03/01/State/Lastjinsurancefix.shtml.
42. THE AMER. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, OVERVIEW OF THE 2009
ACOG SURVEY ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 3 (2009), http://www.acog.org/departments/
professionalLiability/2009PLSurveyNational.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ACOG NATIONAL SURVEY].
43. Trends in 2001 Rates for Physicians' Medical Professional Liability Insurance, 25 MED.
LIAB. MONITOR (Oct. 2001); accord U.S. DEFT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING
THE NEw HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY
FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILYY SYSTEM (2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf.
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ums decreased about 10% from 2006." Also, seven new insurance com-
panies entered the Florida medical malpractice liability insurance market
in 2008.45
The media is quick to credit litigation and excessive jury awards for
the high insurance premiums in Florida.46 In reality, studies show that
insurance premiums fluctuate with the market and there is little data to
support the proposition that there is a direct correlation between an
increase in the occurrence of medical malpractice claims and an increase
in insurance premiums.4 In particular, insurance companies raise their
premium rates when the financial market is down.4 8 Furthermore, pro-
viding insurance is a business and insurance companies invest the premi-
ums for profit, raking in higher profits when litigation declines and
premiums remain high.4 9
The bad news is that Florida insurance premiums remain high,
especially for certain specialties and regions, and, in response, many
physicians in Florida have opted to "go bare." 0 The Florida Department
of Health Division of Medical Quality Assurance reported via e-mail in
January of 2010 that out of the 41,440 physicians licensed to practice
medicine in Florida, 4607 have elected to "go bare" under section
44. 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; Amy Lynn Sorrel, Cautious Optimism Greets
Second Year of Stable, Lower Liability Premiums, AMER. MED. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2007, http://www.
ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/12/17/prl 1217.htm. Premiums for internists averaged $68,867 and
for surgeons and OB-GYNs averaged $275,466. Id. (referencing the Medical Liability Monitor
2007 Rate Survey).
45. 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 36. The increase in the number of insurers in
Florida is beneficial because the increase in competition should decrease premiums for physicians.
See GAO Report, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining how when there are fewer insurers, there is less
price competition).
46. See generally Medical Malpractice Policy: Background Brief, KAISEREDU.ORG, http://
www.kaiseredu.org/topics-im.asp?id=226&imlD=1&parentlD=59 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010)
("there is no solid research on whether the cost of malpractice insurance is the primary factor in
these cases and if this is a systemic barrier to care or whether these are anecdotal situations that
have generated media attention").
47. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4-5 (noting "malpractice insurers experienced decreases
in their investment income as interest rates fell on the bonds that generally make up around 80
percent of these insurers' investment portfolios. . . . a decrease in investment income meant that
income from insurance premiums had to cover a larger share of insurers' costs"); see also Joseph
B. Treaster, Consumer Groups Unite To Track Insurance Prices, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at
C2.
48. GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 5 n.12; see also Treaster, supra note 47.
49. Treaster, supra note 47; FLA. DEP. OF HEALTH, GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 24 (2003), http://www.doh.state.fl.us/
myflorida/DOH-Large-Final%2OBook.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
50. See, e.g., 2009 ACOG NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 42, at 3 (In 2009, almost a
significant number of OB-GYNs in Florida reported dropping all liability insurance coverage in
response to insurance affordability and availability.); see also LaMendola, supra note 14;
Kachalia et al., supra note 3, at 420-21.
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458.320(5)(g)." That means 11% of practicing physicians with active
licenses in Florida carry no medical malpractice liability insurance. The
Florida Division of Medical Quality Assurance also reported that only
860 physicians with hospital privileges opted to satisfy financial respon-
sibility under section 458.320(1)(a) with an irrevocable letter of credit.5 2
According to the Florida Medical Association, the reason why so many
self-insured physicians opt to "go bare" as opposed to establishing irrev-
ocable letters of credit or escrow accounts is the cost associated with the
latter options. However, the FMA assumes that "bare" physicians will
be responsible by setting aside assets to pay any judgments against
them.54
Physicians who practice obstetrics and gynecology, the group that
faces the highest insurance premiums, comprise a large percentage of
the "bare" physician population in Florida. The 2009 Survey on Profes-
sional Liability conducted by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) revealed that 23% of OB-GYNs in Florida
dropped all forms of medical liability insurance since 2006." Currently,
only 59.4% of OB-GYNs in Florida carry medical liability insurance.
This number is striking compared to the national data. Nationally, 95.7%
of OB-GYNs reported that they carried medical malpractice liability
insurance." Of the remaining physicians nationally who elected not to
carry liability insurance, almost half maintained an escrow account,
bond, or irrevocable letter of credit.58
III. THE WAITING Room
A. But Didn't You Read the Sign?
The Florida legislature passed the Tort Reform and Insurance Act
in 1986, which established Chapter 458 and first permitted physicians to
"go bare," to further the following policies: 1) to ensure that physicians
have access to affordable medical malpractice liability insurance; 2) to
ensure stability for insurers; 3) to ensure that injured patients are reason-
51. E-mail supra note 13.
52. Id.
53. E-mail from Janis Indindoli, Legal & Legis. Assist., Fla. Med. Ass'n, to author (Apr. 27,
2010 15:23 EST) [on file with author].
54. "It costs nothing to simply not carry insurance and to set aside or have sufficient assets
available to pay any judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
55. 2009 ACOG NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 42.
56. THE AMER. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, FLORIDA LIABILITY
LowDowN (2009), http://www.acog.org/departments/professionalLiability/2009PLSurveyDistrict
Florida.pdf.
57. 2009 ACOG NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 42.
58. Id.
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ably compensated; and 4) to encourage pre-trial settlements." Specifi-
cally, the legislature developed section 458.320(5)(g) in response to the
rising costs of medical malpractice liability insurance.60
Section 458.320(5)(g)(1) allows physicians to "go bare," in other
words, forego medical malpractice insurance while sidestepping the stat-
ute's alternative means to satisfy financial responsibility, such as proof
of financial responsibility via letters of credit or escrow accounts. 6 1 Sec-
tion 458.320(5)(g) 62 permits physicians with hospital privileges not to
59. TASK FORCE, supra note 49, at 44-46.
60. Id. at 46; N. Miami Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Miller, 896 So. 2d 886, 888 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (describing the legislative policy of section 458.320(5)(g)).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(1) (West 2004).
(1) As a condition of licensing and maintaining an active license, and prior to the
issuance or renewal of an active license or reactivation of an inactive license for the
practice of medicine, an applicant must by one of the following methods
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the board and the department financial
responsibility to pay claims and costs ancillary thereto arising out of the rendering
of, or the failure to render, medical care or services:
(a) Establishing and maintaining an escrow account consisting of cash or assets
eligible for deposit in accordance with s. 625.52 in the per claim amounts specified
in paragraph (b). The required escrow amount set forth in this paragraph may not be
used for litigation costs or attorney's fees for the defense of any medical malpractice
claim.
(b) Obtaining and maintaining professional liability coverage in an amount not less
than $100,000 per claim, with a minimum annual aggregate of not less than
$300,000, from an authorized insurer ... . The required coverage amount set forth
in this paragraph may not be used for litigation costs or attorney's fees for the
defense of any medical malpractice claim.
(c) Obtaining and maintaining an unexpired, irrevocable letter of credit, established
pursuant to chapter 675, in an amount not less than $100,000 per claim, with a
minimum aggregate availability of credit of not less than $300,000. The letter of
credit must be payable to the physician as beneficiary upon presentment of a final
judgment indicating liability and awarding damages to be paid by the physician or
upon presentment of a settlement agreement signed by all parties to such agreement
when such final judgment or settlement is a result of a claim arising out of the
rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care and services. The letter of credit
may not be used for litigation costs or attorney's fees for the defense of any medical
malpractice claim . ...
Id.
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g)(1) (West 2004).
The requirements of subsections (1), (2), and (3) do not apply to:
Any person holding an active license under this chapter who agrees to meet all of
the following criteria: Upon the entry of an adverse final judgment arising from a
medical malpractice arbitration award, from a claim of medical malpractice either in
contract or tort, or from noncompliance with the terms of a settlement agreement
arising from a claim of medical malpractice either in contract or tort, the licensee
shall pay the judgment creditor the lesser of the entire amount of the judgment with
all accrued interest or either $100,000, if the physician is licensed pursuant to this
chapter but does not maintain hospital staff privileges, or $250,000, if the physician
is licensed pursuant to this chapter and maintains hospital staff privileges, within 60
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carry medical malpractice insurance conditioned on their promise to pay
any medical malpractice judgment against them up to $250,000 within a
sixty-day period.6 3 To be in compliance, physicians who opt to "go
bare" must display a sign in their office indicating that they have elected
not to carry medical malpractice liability insurance."6 Physicians who
elect to "go bare" are subject to disciplinary action and possible license
revocation if they do not pay a judgment up to $250,000 within the man-
dated time frame.
B. Bankruptcy's Basics
"The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh
start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.' "66 In a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, the court discharges all of the debtor's remaining debts after the
trustee liquidates all nonexempt assets and distributes the sum amongst
days after the date such judgment became final and subject to execution, unless
otherwise mutually agreed to in writing by the parties. Such adverse final judgment
shall include any cross-claim, counterclaim, or claim for indemnity or contribution
arising from the claim of medical malpractice.
Id.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g) (West 2004). This article focuses on the $250,000 cap
since most physicians maintain hospital privileges.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g)(5) (West 2004).
The licensee has completed a form supplying necessary information as required by
the department.
A licensee who meets the requirements of this paragraph shall be required either to
post notice in the form of a sign prominently displayed in the reception area and
clearly noticeable by all patients or to provide a written statement to any person to
whom medical services are being provided. Such sign or statement shall state:
"Under Florida law, physicians are generally required to carry medical malpractice
insurance or otherwise demonstrate financial responsibility to cover potential claims
for medical malpractice. YOUR DOCTOR HAS DECIDED NOT TO CARRY
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE. This is permitted under Florida law
subject to certain conditions. Florida law imposes penalties against noninsured
physicians who fail to satisfy adverse judgments arising from claims of medical
malpractice. This notice is provided pursuant to Florida law."
Id.
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g)(8) (West 2004).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department shall suspend
the license of any physician against whom has been entered a final judgment,
arbitration award, or other order or who has entered into a settlement agreement to
pay damages arising out of a claim for medical malpractice, if all appellate remedies
have been exhausted and payment up to the amounts required by this section has not
been made within 30 days after the entering of such judgment, award, or order or
agreement, until proof of payment is received by the department or a payment
schedule has been agreed upon by the physician and the claimant and presented to
the department.
Id.
66. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
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creditors."7 While bankruptcy should never be viewed as "an easy way
out,""8 the federal bankruptcy code tends to favor debtors' relief over
creditors' ability to recover.69
The combination of Florida's strong debtor-protective homestead
and exemption laws7 0 and the ability of a Chapter 7 debtor to discharge
debt under the Code, regardless of a finding of good or bad faith,
makes strategic bankruptcy a viable option for Florida debtors who seek
to discharge large tort judgments. A creditor who wants to collect the
full debt owed despite the Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition may file an
adversary complaint seeking to except the debt from discharge under
one of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).7 2 However, any creditor
who attempts to except a debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
bears the burden of proof and "the discharge exception provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code are interpreted narrowly in favor of debtors."7
There are four common theories by which tort creditors attempt to
except debts from discharge.7 1 Section 523(a)(2)(a) excepts from dis-
charge debts that result from fraudulent representations made by the
debtor, other than a statement about the debtor's own financial situa-
tion.7 Section 523(a)(2)(b) excepts from discharge debts obtained by
written statement of the debtor that is materially false about the debtor's
financial condition, upon which the creditor relied, and which the debtor
published with the intent to deceive the creditor.7 6 Section 523(a)(4)
excepts from discharge debts that arise from fraud in a fiduciary capac-
ity." Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts that result from
67. Id. at 367.
68. Michael D. DeFrank, Note & Comment, An Ineffective Escape Hatch: The Textualist
Mistake in Geiger, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 467, 473 (2000).
69. See, e.g., Vans Inc. v. Rosendahl (In re Rosendahl), 307 B.R. 199, 214 (Bankr. D. Or.
2004); see generally White, supra note 10, at 685.
70. White, supra note 10, at 688-91 (explaining how some states, including Florida, are more
favorable bankruptcy settings due to their exemption laws).
71. Bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit have consistently held that there is no implicit
"good faith" requirement for a Chapter 7 petition. See, e.g., In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R.
848, 852 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding "so long as the debtor is willing to surrender all of its
assets, regardless of whether debtor's motive was grounded in good faith, the debtor is entitled to
Chapter 7 protection.").
72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2010).
73. In re Rosendahl, 307 B.R. at 214.
74. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19) (2010). Sections 523(a)(1), (5), (7), (8), (9), (11)-(19) are
not relevant because they refer to specific types of debts (e.g., tax, domestic support, educational)
that do not have the potential to include medical malpractice tort judgments. Sections 523(a)(3) &
(10) are not ordinarily relevant because they except certain debts from discharge as a result of
actions by the debtor in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings (e.g., not listing the debt on the
schedules).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(a) (2010).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(b) (2010).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2010).
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"willful and malicious" conduct by the debtor."
In 2005, Congress shifted the advantage in the direction of creditors
when it passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (BAPCPA) with the addition of the Chapter 7 means test.79
While the means test was included to prevent debtors with the ability to
pay debts from filing for Chapter 7, it does not affect physician-debtors
because the means test only applies to debtors with "primarily consumer
debts."80 The BAPCPA defines a consumer debt as a "debt incurred by
an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose."8"
Under this definition, a medical malpractice judgment would not consti-
tute a consumer debt, meaning physician-debtors petitioning for Chapter
7 bankruptcies do not have to meet the means test.82
Ultimately, bankruptcy courts tend to view a physician-debtor as
independent from her profession. The courts defer to the state licensing
board to handle any compliance issues with financial responsibility and
medical malpractice liability coverage." The courts will grant a self-
insured physician a discharge in bankruptcy regardless of whether he is
compliance with state licensing requirements.8 4 And as long as the phy-
sician-debtor receives a discharge of the medical malpractice debt in
bankruptcy, the Florida Board of Medicine cannot suspend or revoke the
physician's license as a disciplinary action or penalty for not paying the
78. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2010); see generally Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1146
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding successful plaintiff must meet both "willful" and "malicious" prongs of
section 523(a)(6)).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010).
80. Id.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2010).
82. Jordana Mishory, Med Mal Loophole Despite 2005 Overhaul, Doctors Can Still Dodge
Big Judgments by Filing Chapter 7, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Jan. 11, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 28028703 (quoting bankruptcy experts as saying that the means test will not affect the
ability of "bare" self-insured physicians to discharge medical malpractice debts). Cf In re
Alvarez, 57 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (holding that tort liability from a car accident was
not a consumer debt); In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. N.C. 1985) (holding that judgment
from car accident was not a consumer debt because the debt was incidental to the primary purpose
of driving a car for personal use); In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704, 707 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993)
(holding civil judgments for negligence were not consumer debts because they were not incurred
voluntarily for a "personal, family or household purpose")
83. See, e.g., In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336, 337-38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006); see also Hanft v.
Church (In re Hanft), 315 B.R. 617 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd, 73 F. App'x 387 (11th Cir. 2003).
84. Guerra v. Femandez-Rocha (In re Fernandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813, 818 (11th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging that the physician-debtor was not in compliance with the financial responsibility
statute, a condition of medical licensing, but granting discharge anyway). Unsurprisingly, the
Florida Medical Association agrees that licensing issues are matter only for the licensing board
and not for the courts. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Florida Lawsuit Takes Swing at 3-Strikes Liability Rule,
AMER. MED. NEWS, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/10/05/prcal005.htm
(quoting Jeffery M. Scott, General Counsel for the Florida Medical Association, as saying
licensing issues should be determined by the medical licensing board not by juries).
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judgment.8 5 Thus, "bare" self-insured physicians are able to discharge
medical malpractice debts in bankruptcy and remain in compliance with
the Florida Financial Responsibility statute.86
IV. FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY: A SELF-INSURED PHYSICIAN'S
ABILITY To DISCHARGE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
JUDGMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY WHILE
"GOING BARE"
The Florida State Legislature enacted section 458.320 with the dis-
tinct policy of lightening the burden of increasing insurance premiums
on physicians while ensuring that injured patients receive compensa-
tion.87 On the other hand, the policy behind section 523(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is generally to favor the debtor's opportunity for a fresh
start over the creditor's right to recover debts owed." These two poli-
cies, stemming from two separate governmental bodies, were each
enacted without thought of the impact on the policies behind the other.
When both are in play in a single case, courts seem unable to reconcile
the policies into a fair result for an injured patient.
A large judgment against any tortfeasor-including physicians-is
a life-altering event that can have devastating financial consequences.
Whether a physician is insured or is "bare," a large medical malpractice
judgment against a physician can be a catalyst for bankruptcy. Being
aware of the frequency of medical malpractice suits and the financial
repercussions of a medical malpractice judgment, many physicians
engage in extensive asset-protection schemes to shield themselves from
personal liability yet continue to live comfortable lifestyles. 9 A "bare"
85. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2010). "[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a license [of] a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act . . . or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case
under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act." Id.
86. See, e.g., Mishory, supra note 82 (explaining how a discharge in bankruptcy distinguishes
the debt owed so that a self-insured physician is still in compliance with financial responsibility).
Calls and e-mails with questions regarding the repercussions for a "bare" physician who petitions
for bankruptcy were not returned by the Florida Board of Medicine or the Communication Office
of the Department of Medical Quality Assurance.
87. TASK FORCE, supra note 49, at 44-46.
88. See generally Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("the primary purposes
of the Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness,
and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes.'") (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-55 (1915)).
89. See, e.g., Goldenberg 1, 218 F.3d at 1264; Abrahamson v. Doyan (In re Doyan), 204 B.R.
250, 259 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (describing how the physician-debtor sheltered his assets to
make him judgment-proof). See generally Personal Asset Protection for Physicians, http://www.
assetprotectionlawjournal.com/2009/09/articles/physician-asset-protection/personal-asset-
protection-for-physicians/ (Sept. 1, 2009) (suggesting ways for physicians to shield assets in the
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physician with minimal or no nonexempt assets is no longer a viable
defendant in a medical malpractice suit because there is no incentive for
a plaintiff or a plaintiff's attorney to sue a defendant without any means
to pay a judgment.
Sometimes insured physicians also petition for bankruptcy after a
large judgment is issued against them. Bankruptcy courts across the
country have consistently given medical malpractice plaintiffs relief
from the automatic stay to pursue their claims against an insured physi-
cian-debtor in state court. 90 However, the bankruptcy courts condition
the relief from automatic stay on the caveat that the plaintiff may only
establish the physician's nominal liability in order to trigger an insur-
ance payment, and not to recover from the physician personally. 91 The
Fifth Circuit has commented that "a discharge in bankruptcy does not
extinguish the debt itself, but merely releases the debtor from personal
liability for the debt."92
The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged in the context of bank-
ruptcy that "[t]he 'fresh-start' policy is not intended to provide a method
by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the finan-
cial misfortunes of the insured." 93 However, the bankruptcy courts in the
Eleventh Circuit and the Florida legislature appear not to have antici-
pated the effect on a meritorious plaintiffs recovery when the insurer
and the insured are the same entity-in other words, self-insured physi-
cians who seek bankruptcy protection.
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office considered the impli-
cations of self-insured physicians. 94 The report expressed general disap-
proval of state statutory provisions for self-insurance because of lack of
event of a medical malpractice claim); White, supra note 10, at 703-07 (describing strategic
bankruptcy and asset protection).
90. Owaski v. Jet Fla. Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970, 975 (11 th Cir. 1989);
Venn v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (In re Kimbell), 99 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 1996)
(describing in the facts as to how the bankruptcy court granted relief from automatic stay so that
the plaintiff could establish liability against the physician-debtor in order to recover from the
insurance company; the remaining judgment balance was classified as a "general, non-priority,
unsecured claim" that could not be enforced against the bankruptcy estate). See generally Milton
v. Sewell (In re Sewell), 2004 WL 3623506, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (stating "a creditor may
be permitted to establish the debtor's nominal liability for a claim solely for the purpose of
collecting the debt from a third party, such as an insurer or guarantor").
91. Venn, 99 F.3d at 1061.
92. Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
patient may commence a medical malpractice suit against an insured physician-debtor to establish
liability in order to recover from the physician's insurer).
93. In re Jet Fla., 883 F.2d at 975; see also In re Castle, 289 B.R. 882, 889 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2003) (acknowledging it would be "fundamentally wrong" to permit a medical malpractice
liability insurance company to receive a windfall because the insured physician filed for
bankruptcy).
94. The main goal of the report was to explain the reasons for the high medical malpractice
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oversight, increased insolvency risk for the self-insured physician, and
reduced access to remedy for the claimants.95 With the underlying bank-
ruptcy policy rationale in mind coupled with the federal government's
disapproval of self-insured statutory schemes, it is difficult to understand
why the Florida legislature has continued a statutory scheme whereby
the "bare" self-insured physician-tortfeasor does not have to conform to
the nationally-accepted insurance system,9 6 yet may escape his obliga-
tions to an injured party via bankruptcy.97
Under the current statutory scheme, if a self-insured physician
without adequate non-exempt assets files for bankruptcy and seeks to
discharge a medical malpractice debt, no matter if it is a settlement sum
or jury-determined damages, the bankruptcy court will discharge the
debt and leave the injured patient without remedy.98 Further, the Florida
Medical Licensing Board does not consider a discharge in bankruptcy to
be a failure to pay a judgment under section 458.320, therefore making
the "penalty for not paying a judgment" meaningless in the context of
bankruptcy. 99 Additionally, once a physician instigates a bankruptcy
proceeding, any attempt by the patient to bring the unpaid judgment to
the attention of the State of Florida Department of Professional Regula-
tion (DPR) constitutes a violation of the section 362(a) automatic stay,
subjecting the patient to sanctions."
A. Empty Promises
After the enactment of section 458.320(5)(g), it was not immedi-
ately clear how the option to "go bare" would affect a meritorious
patient-plaintiff's ability to recover damages. If a successful patient-
plaintiff was concerned about the self-insured physician-defendant's
insurance premiums throughout the country and in Florida, in particular. GAO REPORT, supra note
18, at 39-41.
95. Id.
96. MELLO, supra note 21, at 1.
97. It is interesting to note that in the late 1990s, various bills were introduced in Congress to
attempt to prevent physicians who owed money to Medicare and Medicaid from filing for
bankruptcy and discharging the monies owed to the government. SAMUEL R. MAIZEL, AMER.
HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, Seminar Materials, HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT (1997), available at AHLA-PAPERS P10309733.
98. See, e.g., Guerra v. Fernandez-Rocha (In re Fernandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813 (11th Cir.
2006); Hanft v. Church (In re Hanft), 315 BR. 617 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd, 73 F. App'x 387 (11th
Cir. 2003); In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2010) (prohibiting state licensing boards from suspending or
revoking licenses for failure to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy); see also LaMendola, supra
note 14.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); In re Grau, 172 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)
(holding indicates that reporting the bankruptcy to the licensing board post-petition would violate
automatic stay as coercing the physician-debtor to either pay the judgment-debt or face discipline
from the licensing board).
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willingness and ability to satisfy the judgment, an astute patient-plaintiff
could file an inquiry with the DPR to ensure that the physician would
pay the judgment."0 ' A "bare" self-insured physician has only 60 days to
pay a medical malpractice judgment before being subject to disciplinary
action by the Florida Board of Medicine.10 2 However, if the physician
petitioned for bankruptcy before the patient launched an inquiry with the
DPR, then the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code10 3 would
prevent the patient inquiry as a willful violation of the automatic stay
"designed to place the debtor in a position of either paying a pre-petition
claim . .. or losing his medical license for failure to pay [the patient's]
judgment."'"
As more physicians who had opted to "go bare" began to petition
for bankruptcy, an interesting plaintiff strategy developed. Patient-plain-
tiffs who had been successful in state court medical malpractice suits
filed in the bankruptcy proceedings to except the medical malpractice
judgments from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).' 0 s They alleged
that self-insured physician-debtors committed fraud by promising to pay
a judgment up to $250,000 under section 458.320(5)(g), and then filing
for bankruptcy once an actual judgment was entered against them. 106
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected
this argument.o
In March of 1992, the parents of infant Tyler Caccamo alleged that
Dr. Pouliot, an OB-GYN who had elected to "go bare," negligently
caused a skull fracture, resulting in neurological damage to Tyler during
his delivery. 1 At the time of Tyler's delivery, Dr. Pouliot was in com-
pliance with section 458.320(5)(g)(5) and Ms. Caccamo (the injured
child's mother) acknowledged that she had read the sign in Dr. Pouliot's
office that stated he did not carry medical malpractice liability insurance
and that he would satisfy a judgment up to $250,000 or face disciplinary
action by the licensing board.o10 In November of 1992, Dr. Pouliot peti-
tioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after the incident but before a lawsuit
101. See, e.g., In re Grau, 172 B.R. at 686. In re Grau addressed a situation where the patient-
plaintiff filed an inquiry with the DPR thirty days after order of a $350,000 judgment against the
physician. The "bare" physician-debtor then petitioned for bankruptcy and attempted to sanction
the patient-plaintiff for following up with the DPR inquiry post-petition. Id.
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g) (West 2004).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
104. Cf In re Grau, 172 B.R. at 689-690 (denying physician-debtor's motion to enforce
automatic stay because the DPR inquiry was initiated pre-petition).
105. See, e.g., Caccamo v. Pouliot (In re Pouliot), 196 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 644.
109. Id. at 645.
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was filed. 1 o Then, three years later in 1995, the Caccamos entered
into a consent judgment with Dr. Pouliot for $10 million 1 and
subsequently filed an advisory complaint in Dr. Pouliot's ongoing bank-
ruptcy proceeding to except the consent judgment from discharge"12
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(a)," 3 523(a)(2)(b)," 4 523(a)(4),"I and
523(a)(6)." 6
It would seem to be fair that a physician who saved money because
he did not pay liability insurance premiums and posted a sign for
patients to read that said he would pay a judgment up to $250,000
should have to pay that sum upon execution of a consent judgment forty
times as large. However, on the debtor's motion for summary judgment,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that
the sign in Dr. Pouliot's office was insufficient alone to establish fraud
on behalf of the debtor to except the medical malpractice debt from dis-
charge under section 523(a)(2)(a) because the debtor's statement on the
sign only referred to his own financial condition."' Further, the bank-
ruptcy court held that the sign was not a materially false statement under
section 523(a)(2)(b) because it provided that the physician-debtor had
the option to either pay a judgment up to $250,000 or be subjected to
disciplinary action; therefore the physician-debtor never actually prom-
ised to pay the judgment. 18 This decision effectively turned the sign
requirement of section 458.320(5)(g)(5) into a formality that lacks
enforceability once a bankruptcy court grants discharge."' 9 Although the
In re Pouliot Court read the sign as giving the physician the option to
pay the judgment or face disciplinary action, the state cannot discipline
110. Id.
I11. Id. at 644. The Caccamos fought Dr. Pouliot's attempt to discharge the judgment since the
consent judgment for a pre-petition act was entered into post-petition. Id. at 652-53.
112. Id. at 645.
113. Section 523(a)(2)(a) excepts from discharge debts that result from fraudulent
representations made by the debtor, other than a statement about the debtor's own financial
situation. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(a) (2010).
114. Section 523(a)(2)(b) excepts from discharge debts obtained by written statement of the
debtor that is materially false, about the debtor's financial condition, upon which the creditor
relied, and which the debtor published with the intent to deceive the creditor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(b) (2007).
115. Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge debts that arise from fraud in a fiduciary
capacity. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2010).
116. Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts that result from "willful and malicious"
conduct by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2010).
117. In re Pouliot, 196 B.R. at 646.
118. Id. at 648-49.
119. Cf Abrahamson v. Doyan (In re Doyan), 204 B.R. 250, 257-58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996)
(holding "bare" physician-debtor's displayed sign stating that he did not carry medical malpractice
liability insurance because it was not affordable as opposed to including the boilerplate language
as provided by section 458.320(5)(g)(5) was an intentional effort to defraud patients and thus
made his medical malpractice judgment non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(a)).
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physicians for non-payment when they discharge their judgments in
bankruptcy.'2 0
The bankruptcy court also rejected the patient's claim that the
financial responsibility statute created a fiduciary relationship between
the physician and patient under section 523(a)(4).12 ' A few years later,
in 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held that "Florida's Financial Responsibility Act [provisions
requiring insurance, an escrow account, or letter of credit] create neither
a fiduciary duty nor a technical trust" within the province of section
523(a)(4) and cited In re Pouliot to support this proposition.12 2 Specifi-
cally, the District Court reasoned that patients injured subsequent to the
creation of an escrow account or irrevocable letter of credit cannot be
considered "identifiable beneficiaries."l 2 3
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged two additional theories for why the
medical malpractice judgment should be excepted from discharge under
section 523(a)(6).124 The first theory was that Dr. Pouliot willfully and
maliciously violated the Financial Responsibility statute by electing to
"go bare" and then sheltering assets and filing for bankruptcy post judg-
ment. 12 5 The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, reasoning that
"even if Dr. Pouliot transferred his assets with the intent of putting them
beyond the reach of Plaintiffs, such acts do not constitute wilful [sic]
and malicious injury to Plaintiffs or their property." 2 6 The bankruptcy
court undermined the requirements of section 458.320(5)(g) when it
rejected the argument that the medical malpractice debt was the result of
Dr. Pouliot's willful and malicious misrepresentations that he would pay
$10 million in damages in accordance with the consent judgment (or a
judgment up to $250,000 in accordance with the sign in his office),
knowing he would attempt in his bankruptcy to discharge his responsi-
120. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2010). "[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a license [of] a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act . . . or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case
under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act." Id.
121. In re Pouliot, 196 B.R. at 651.
122. Hanft v. Church (In re Hanft), 315 B.R. 617, 623 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd, 73 F. App'x 387
(11th Cir. 2003); see also Guerra v. Ramon (In re Ramon), No. 05-20073-CIV, 2005 WL
2465606, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2005) (holding escrow account under section 458.320(1)
does not create fiduciary duty or technical trust to satisfy section 523(a)(4)), aff'd, 189 F. App'x
910 (11th Cir. 2006).
123. Id. at 623-24.
124. In re Pouliot, 196 B.R. at 651-53.
125. Id. at 652-53.
126. Id. at 653. But see Abrahamson v. Doyan (In re Doyan), 204 B.R. 250, 259 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1996) (finding that the self-insured physician's acts of sheltering assets constituted "conduct
[that] was willfully and maliciously undertaken with the express purpose of making himself
judgment-proof').
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bility to pay any sum.127
The plaintiffs' final theory, under section 523(a)(6), was that Dr.
Pouliot's medical treatment was grossly negligent and constituted will-
ful and malicious injury because the physician's acts were substantially
certain to result in injury to the patient.128 The court denied summary
judgment on whether the physician's injury-causing acts were willful
and malicious so as to except the judgment from discharge.12 9 Specifi-
cally, the court found "that a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether
Dr. Pouliot's alleged malpractice constituted a 'wilful' [sic] injury to
Tyler when he committed certain intentional acts the purpose which may
have been substantially certain to cause Tyler's injuries."13 0
The bankruptcy court judgment left the Caccamos and subsequent
patient-plaintiffs in adversarial proceedings against physician-debtors
with one last bit of hope when it reaffirmed the Eleventh Circuit's "sub-
stantially certain to cause injury" standard as an applicable test for
whether the physician intended to injure the patient.1 3 ' Unfortunately, a
unanimous Supreme Court in Geiger effectively eliminated the option of
using section 523(a)(6) to except a medical malpractice judgment from
discharge, by reasoning that the negligence-based tort of medical mal-
practice can never be willful and malicious. 132
B. Geiger and Section 523(a)(6)
Up until the pivotal 1998 Supreme Court decision of Kawaauhua v.
127. In re Pouliot, 196 B.R. at 652-53.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 651-53.
130. Id. at 653.
131. Id. at 652; Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
established "substantially certain" standard under section 523(a)(6) in the Eleventh Circuit); see
also Abrahamson v. Doyan (In re Doyan), 204 B.R. 250, 258-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding
the physician-debtor's medical malpractice debt was non-dischargeable under section 523(a)( 6 )).
132. Kawaauhua v. Geiger (In re Geiger) (Geiger III), 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (holding an act that
results in injury absent the intent to cause injury cannot be "willful and malicious" under section
523(a)(6) without addressing whether the subjective "substantially certain to result in injury"
standard may also apply). Although most circuits have reaffirmed the "substantially certain to
result in injury" standard post-Geiger, the courts nevertheless continue to reject section 523(a)(6)
arguments to except medical malpractice debts from discharge. Ditto v. McCurdy (In re
McCurdy), 510 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding "[Ithe failure to obtain informed
consent, without evidence of intent to injure, does not give rise to a willful and malicious injury
within the meaning of § 523(a)(6)"); Kowalski v. Romano (In re Romano), No. 01-1822, 2003
WL 731723 (6th Cir. Mar. 3 2003) (holding this particular judgment could not be excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(6) because it sounded in "negligence and medical malpractice" yet
preserved "substantially certain to cause injury" standard). Contra Wagner v. Schulte (In re
Schulte), 385 BR. 181, 189-91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (holding medical malpractice was
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where prior state court decision found that the
physician willfully and maliciously injured the patient).
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Geiger,'3 3 a number of bankruptcy courts around the country, and in
Florida specifically, used 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to except medical mal-
practice judgments from discharge.' 3 4 The bankruptcy courts reasoned
that if a physician made too many consecutive errors'13  or the physi-
cian's care was suffuciently far below the acceptable standard,1 3 1 then
the physician intentionally acted in a way that injured the patient and
thus satisfied the "willful and malicious" criterion. The Geiger Court
held that an intentional act that resulted in injury was not sufficient-
instead, the physician must have acted in a way to intentionally injure
the patient-the injury, not just the act, must have been intentional. 3 7
In 1983, Dr. Paul Geiger, a self-insured physician in Hawaii,
treated Margaret Kawaauhau after she dropped a box on her foot.138
Hawaii law, like that in Florida, permitted physicians to "go bare".'3
Although Dr. Geiger acknowledged that Mrs. Kawaauhua was exhibit-
ing symptoms of a bacterial infection, he left town on a business trip and
subsequently ceased prophylactic antibiotics that had been prescribed by
his colleagues in his absence.140 As a result, Ms. Kawaauhau's right leg
had to be amputated below the knee.' 4 ' A jury awarded Ms. Kawaauhau
and her husband $355,000 in damages.' 4 2 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Geiger
filed for bankruptcy in Missouri.'43
The Kawaauhaus attempted to except the medical malpractice judg-
ment from discharge as willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C.
133. 523 U.S. at 57.
134. See, e.g., Corsi v. Berman (In re Berman), 154 B.R. 991, 1003-04 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)
(excepting medical malpractice debt from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where physician
made intentional misrepresentations about his qualifications and the procedure); Abrahamson v.
Doyan (In re Doyan), 204 B.R. 250, 258-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (excepting medical
malpractice debt from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where Board of Medicine found the
physician's care to be below standard of care and bankruptcy court determined that the
physician's intentional acts were substantially certain to injure the patient); Kawaauhau v. Geiger
(In re Geiger) (Geiger 1), 172 B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (excepting medical malpractice
debt from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where court found the physician's repeated errors
constituted substandard care), rev'd, 93 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); see
also Perkins v. Scharffe (In re Scharffe), 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.) (excepting medical malpractice
debt from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where physician used unsterile needle), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 853 (1987), overruled by Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455 (6th
Cir. 1999).
135. See, e.g., Geiger 1, 172 B.R. at 916.
136. See, e.g., In re Doyan, 204 B.R. at 258-59.
137. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 61.
138. Geiger 1, 172 B.R. at 917.
139. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 59 n.2.
140. Id. at 59.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 60. Dr. Geiger moved to Missouri after the medical malpractice incident in Hawaii.
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§ 523(a)(6).1'" The bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Missouri
ruled that the medical malpractice debt should be excepted from dis-
charge.' 4 5 The bankruptcy court found that "the repeated errors Dr. Gei-
ger made in treating Mrs. Kawaauhau evidence . . . 'disregard of
acceptable medical practice"' and that both the expert testimony and Dr.
Geiger's own testimony in state court demonstrated that "Dr. Geiger's
egregious errors of judgement [sic] led to the worsening of Mrs.
Kawaauhau's condition and to the eventual amputation of part of her
leg."l46
However, on appeal, both the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's interpretation
of section 523(a)(6).14 1 The Supreme Court of the United States adopted
the Eighth Circuit's definition of "willful" as limited to conduct that the
actor intends to cause injury and not merely intentional conduct that
results in injury. 148
The Kawaauhaus also argued that "as a policy matter, malpractice
judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor
acted recklessly or carried no malpractice insurance."l 49 The Court
rejected the policy argument because Congress did not address this spe-
cific scenario.' Ultimately, the Court held that a medical malpractice
debt based on grossly negligent or reckless behavior should not be
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6).15 1 Only debts that
arise from intentional injury trigger the exception to discharge.15 2 As a
result, the bankruptcy court awarded Dr. Geiger a "fresh start" and the
Kawaauhaus never recovered any part of the judgment awarded for the
injury that resulted from Dr. Geiger's negligent care of Ms.
Kawaauhau.' 53
After the Geiger decision, bankruptcy courts had to determine
144. Id.
145. Geiger 1, 172 B.R. at 923.
146. Id.
147. Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In re Geiger) (Geiger II), 113 F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd,
523 U.S. 57 (1998).
148. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 61. This limited definition of "willful and malicious" has been
used to foreclose recovery of various other tort judgments. See, e.g., McGee v. Marcum (In re
Marcum), 184 F. App'x 464, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2006) (denying section 523(a)(6) exception to
discharge for wrongful death judgment where court did not consider coal mine owner's failure to
comply with federal coal mine safety regulations as evidence of intent to injure).
149. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 64.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 58, 62, 64. The Supreme Court did not elaborate a definition of "malice" in this
case.
152. Id.
153. Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
449, 479-80 (1999).
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whether to apply exclusively the Supreme Court sanctioned standard
that requires an intent to injure or whether a subjective "substantially
certain to cause injury" standard as propounded by the Restatement
(Second) of Tortsl5 4 was also applicable.' 5 The Geiger Court did not
discuss the "substantially certain to result in injury" standard at all.156
Post-Geiger, the Eleventh Circuit has reaffirmed the "substantially cer-
tain to result in injury" standard outside the context of medical malprac-
tice debts.'5 However, it has yet to address the applicability of the
"substantially certain" standard to medical malpractice debts in particu-
lar. Further, bankruptcy courts around the country continue to reject sec-
tion 523(a)(6) arguments to except medical malpractice debts from
discharge.15 8
C. Keeping the (Bad) Faith
After the Supreme Court in Geiger declined to address the policy
argument of whether medical malpractice judgments should always be
excepted from discharge where the physician is "bare,"1 59 the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida set forth an opin-
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1964).
155. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2002).
156. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 61 (holding an act that results in injury absent the intent to cause
injury cannot be "willful and malicious" under section 523(a)(6) without addressing whether the
subjective "substantially certain to result in injury" standard may also apply); see also In re Su,
290 F.3d at 1143 (discussing whether Geiger foreclosed "substantially certain" standard). The
courts consider the debtor's intent to be the crux of whether "willful and malicious" is satisfied.
Therefore, whether the debtor subjectively realized her actions would be substantially certain to
cause injury becomes the alternative inquiry. Geiger leaves open the question of whether a debtor-
physician should be liable for a debt where the physician's motive was not necessarily to injure
the patient, yet the physician nevertheless acted in a way whereby she knew her actions were
likely to injure the patient.
157. Thomas v. Loveless (In re Thomas), No. 07-14357, 2008 WL 1765264, at *2 (11th Cir.
Apr. 18, 2008) (holding cites the "substantially certain" standard from Hope v. Walker (In re
Walker), 48 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1995)). The bankruptcy courts, however, disagree as to which
standard applies. Compare New Buffalo Say. Bank v. McClung (In re McClung), 335 B.R. 466,
474 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding willful requires the intent to injure and rejecting
substantially certain standard) with Hernandez v. Pulido (In re Pulido), No. 08-23367-CIV, 2009
WL 1442010, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2009) (holding rejects interpretation of Geiger that only
debts stemming from conduct intended to injure may be excepted from discharge as too limited).
158. Ditto v. McCurdy (In re McCurdy), 510 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
"[t]he failure to obtain informed consent, without evidence of intent to injure, does not give rise to
a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6)"); Kowalski v. Romano (In re
Romano), 59 F. App'x 709, 715 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding this particular judgment could not be
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6) because it sounded in "negligence and medical
malpractice" yet preserved "substantially certain to cause injury" standard). Contra Wagner v.
Schulte (In re Schulte), 385 B.R. 181, 189-91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (holding medical
malpractice was excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6) where prior state court decision
found that the physician willfully and maliciously injured the patient).
159. 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
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ion that outlined its view on how the bankruptcy courts should handle
"bad faith" allegations against "bare" physician-debtors.160 In re Far-
kas' 6' provides a prime example of a physician who used section
458.320(5)(g) to avoid paying medical malpractice liability insurance
premiums, petitioned for strategic bankruptcy to avoid personal liability
for potential medical malpractice judgments, and then faced no real con-
sequence because the Florida Board of Medicine did not discipline him
for failing to satisfy financial responsibility. 16 2
Before Dr. Farkas, the physician-debtor, petitioned for bankruptcy,
two former patients had sued him for medical malpractice. 163 The first
patient alleged that Dr. Farkas negligently inserted metal rods into his
spine that eventually migrated to the patient's brain and caused spinal
instability. 164 The second patient alleged that Dr. Farkas negligently
injured her back when a drill fell out of his hand during surgery.165
Before either case went to trial, Dr. Farkas petitioned for Chapter 7
bankruptcy.1 66
Both former patients offered proofs of claim in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding for the amounts of $9 million and $800,000 respectively. 167
They also filed motions to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding for bad
faith under 11 U.S.C. § 707 alleging that the sole purpose of the physi-
cian-debtor's bankruptcy was to interfere with the medical malpractice
claims.168 The bankruptcy court rejected this argument and held that
there cannot be a finding of "bad faith" where the debtor has volunteered
to give up his non-exempt assets. 169 The opinion neglected to mention
that the physician-debtor had $2.6 million in exempt assets and a $1.6
million oceanfront home, but only $16,200 of assets available for
creditors. 170
The patients also argued that the physician-debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding interfered with the licensing board's regulation of physicians
because the physician was not complying with the Financial Responsi-
bility statute by his chosen method-a promise to pay-if he discharged
160. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
161. Id.
162. Mishory, supra note 82 (reporting that the Florida Board of Health did not discipline Dr.
Farkas).
163. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 337.
164. Id. A jury trial was set for March 2005. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Dr. Farkas originally petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2004 and converted the
case to Chapter 7 in 2005. Id.
167. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 337.
168. Id. at 338.
169. Id. at 339-40.
170. LaMendola, supra note 14.
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the judgments in bankruptcy."' Finally, the patients contended that if
the bankruptcy court discharged the claims before judgment then those
two judgments would not qualify as strikes against the physician under
Florida's recent "Three Strikes" Amendment.172
The In re Farkas Court adopted the physician-debtor's argument
that "alleged violations of both the Florida Medical Financial Responsi-
bility Law and Florida's 'Three Strikes' Amendment should be directed
to the Florida Board of Medicine and not the Bankruptcy Court."' 73 The
court went on to state: "While the Court is sympathetic to the [patients']
desire to have the merits of their case adjudicated without this bank-
ruptcy case 'derailing' their efforts, this Court finds that neither Dr. Far-
kas, nor the [bankruptcy] provisions contained in Title 11, interfere with
the State of Florida's protection of public health."174 After the bank-
ruptcy court discharged the patients' claims, a local newspaper reported
that neither patient ever received any remedy for their injuries from the
physician.175
D. The Florida Supreme Court Relieves Hospitals of Liability
Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court used section
458.320(5)(g) to limit injured patients' ability to recover by removing
any incentive for hospitals to require physicians with privileges to carry
medical malpractice insurance independent from the Financial Responsi-
171. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 337-38.
172. Id. at 338; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. Amendment 8, more commonly known as the "Three
Strikes" amendment, has proved to be blatantly ineffective due the implementing legislation's
definition of a strike. Sorrel, supra note 84.
173. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 338. Not surprisingly, Jeffery M. Scott, general counsel for the
Florida Medical Association, agrees that licensing issues should be determined by the medical
licensing board not by the courts. Sorrel, supra note 84.
174. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 338.
175. Id. at 336; LaMendola, supra note 14.
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bility statute."7 In Horowitz v. Plantation General Hospital Ltd.,"7 the
Florida Supreme Court overruled existing Florida precedent17 8  and
rejected a claim that hospitals should be strictly liable for the acts of
"bare" physicians to whom they had granted privileges.1 7 1 In Horowitz,
the successful patient-plaintiff had won an $859,200.73 judgment
against a physician.' When the "bare" self-insured physician-defendant
fled the country, the plaintiff attempted to collect $250,000 of the judg-
ment from the hospital at which the physician had committed the mal-
practice.' The patient alleged that the hospital should be liable under
section 458.320(2) for failing to confirm that the physician was in com-
pliance with the financial responsibility statute.182
Prior to this case, district courts of appeals throughout Florida had
held hospitals liable if a "bare" physician with privileges did not pay a
medical malpractice judgment.'8 3 The courts reasoned that the intent of
section 458.320(2)184 "was to make sure that a person injured by the
medical malpractice of a doctor with staff privileges would be able to
176. Hospitals require physicians to sign a form stating they are in compliance with financial
responsibility. See, e.g., Certificate of Financial Responsibility, Baptist Health (on file with
author).
I, hereby attest that to the best of my
knowledge, I am in full compliance with the Florida Tort Reform and Insurance Act
of 1986, meet the financial responsibility requirements of Florida Law through one
of the following arrangements listed below. (check one)
0 I have agreed to be personally responsible for the payment of any settlement for
final judgment up to $250,000 including all court fees and accrued interest for
which the physician is responsible.
Id.
However, most do not independently require the physicians to carry medical malpractice
insurance as a condition of privilege. E-mail from Baptist Hospital of Miami, to author (Apr. 29,
2010, 14:09 EST) (on file with author). About half of the physicians with privileges at Baptist
Hospital do not carry medical malpractice liability insurance. Id.
177. 959 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2007).
178. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Baumgardner, 870 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
hospitals strictly liable when "bare" physician with privileges did not pay judgment), cert. denied,
879 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2004), invalidated by Horowitz v. Plantation General Hosp. Ltd., 959 So. 2d
176 (Fla. 2007).
179. Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 176.
180. Id. at 178.
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. Robert v. Paschall, 767 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Baker v. Tenet
Healthsystem Hosps., Inc., 780 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Mercy Hosp., Inc., 870 So.
2d at 130.
184. Section 458.320(2) requires physicians with hospital privileges to carry medical
malpractice insurance, establish an escrow account, or attain an irrevocable letter of credits.
Section 458.320(5)(g) allows physicians to opt of out of the requirements of section 458.320(2) if
they promise to pay a judgment up to $250,000.
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ultimately recover at least $250,000 of compensable damages."', 5 But in
Horowitz, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the rationale presented by
the Florida Hospital Association's AMIcus CURIAE BRIEF that "given
... the 'opt-out' provision in section 458.320(5)(g), it would be incon-
sistent to read section 458.320(2) as requiring a hospital to ensure or
guarantee payment of the first $250,000 of a malpractice judgment
against a physician" when the physician herself is not required to guar-
antee payment.186
While the holding in Horowitz was met with praise by hospitals and
physicians throughout the state, trial lawyers expressed concern about
the legal repercussions of this additional loophole in physician over-
sight.'8 By this time, the bankruptcy courts had already foreclosed the
various attempts to except medical malpractice judgments from dis-
charge under section 523(a)' and to dismiss "bare" physicians' bank-
ruptcy petitions for bad faith.'8 9 The Horowitz opinion eliminated the
last legal option for patients to recover for injuries caused by "bare"
physician determined not to pay any judgment.
V. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
Section 458.320(5)(g) provides physicians in Florida with fairly
lenient conditions to satisfy financial responsibility as a requirement of
medical licensing. Just having to post a sign in the waiting room and
promising to pay a judgment up to $250,000,0 a sum less than the
national average medical malpractice award,' 9 ' seems to be a pretty gen-
erous exchange for being allowed to forego the extremely high liability
insurance premiums for some specialties in Florida. From a pure num-
bers standpoint, an OB-GYN who elects to "go bare" for just one year
has already saved enough money from not having to pay the average
annual liability insurance premiums of $275,000 to pay the $250,000
judgment cap if a medical malpractice incident should occur. But the
physicians who opt to "go bare" tend to take the money saved from not
having to pay the medical malpractice liability premiums and make it
185. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 870 So. 2d at 131 (quoting Robert, 767 So. 2d at 1228).
186. Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 184 (explaining that a hospital should not have to guarantee the
future financial state of a physician). The Florida Hospital Association claims it is too hard for
hospitals to police physicians as to whether they are complying with state licensing requirements.
Amy Lynn Sorrel, Hospital in Florida Not Liable for Uninsured Doctor, AMER. MED. NEWS, June
18, 2007, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/06/18/prsaO6l8.htm.
187. Sorrel, supra note 186.
188. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-C.
189. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(5)(g) (West 2004).
191. The national average medical malpractice payout in 2008 was $326,992. 2008 FLORIDA
CLAIMS, supra note 37.
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judgment-proof instead of setting it aside for future medical malpractice
judgments.19 2 This amounts to a windfall for "bare" physicians at the
expense of an available remedy for an injured patient. I set forth below
proposed statutory changes in federal bankruptcy law and then in Florida
law.
A. A New Exception
The express policy of bankruptcy is to alleviate an honest and
unfortunate debtor from excess debt in exchange for the debtor's relin-
quishment of his assets to his creditors.' 9 3 Currently, the bankruptcy
courts insist that all Chapter 7 debtors, except those with mainly con-
sumer debts, are equally entitled to a "fresh start."l 94 The bankruptcy
courts impose no requirement of good faith, even where the physician-
debtor is found to be petitioning for bankruptcy solely to avoid paying a
medical malpractice judgment." Additionally, a medical malpractice
judgment debt had been held not to fit any of the current exceptions
from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).196
While a "fresh start" for an unfortunate debtor is the overarching
policy of bankruptcy relief,19 7 it should not be the only policy, as recog-
nized in the existing exceptions. The bankruptcy code takes into account
that certain debts should always be paid.'9 Congress has already taken
steps to protect credit card companies by imposing a means test on
Chapter 7 debtors with mostly consumer debts.199 Congress should simi-
larly enact legislation to protect injured patients by eliminating the type
of loophole created by section 458.320(5)(g) in the bankruptcy arena.
As with the existing exceptions to discharge recognized by section
523(a), Congress should create an additional exception that specifically
references medical malpractice judgments owed by "bare" self-insured
physicians. This new exception would acknowledge the policy argument
presented in Geiger that the Court was unwilling to address because
192. See, e.g., Goldenberg II, 253 F.3d at 1272; LaMendola, supra note 14.
193. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (bankruptcy "gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.").
194. In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
195. Id.
196. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-B.
197. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
198. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2010) (excepting domestic support debts from
discharge).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010).
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Congress had not yet referenced the scenario in the Bankruptcy Code.2 00
A new section 523(a) exception to discharge for medical malpractice
judgment debts would be analogous to the section 523(a)(9) exception to
discharge for tort judgments resulting from driving while intoxicated.20 1
The new section could read:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-up
to $250,000 or the state statutorily prescribed maximum liability,
whichever is greater, for death or personal injury caused by a self-
insured physician's medical malpractice where the physician per state
statute lawfully opted out of carrying medical malpractice liability
insurance on the condition of payment of a judgment.
B. Repeal Section 458.320(5)(g)
The Florida Legislature enacted the Financial Responsibility statute
to increase the availability of medical services in light of increasing
costs of medical malpractice liability insurance premiums.2 0 2 Amongst
the various attempts to decrease health care spending via tort reform,20 3
the 1986 Act's decision to permit physicians in Florida to "go bare" may
be the most nonsensical. In 2005, bills were introduced in both the Flor-
ida Senate and House that attempted to increase the minimum medical
malpractice liability coverage, to expand the other self-insurance options
of escrow accounts and letters of credit, and to eliminate the opt-out
provision in section 458.320(5)(g). 2" Unfortunately, both bills died in
committee. The Florida Legislature should repeal section 458.320(5)(g),
particularly in light of how the legislation has intersected with bank-
ruptcy law to produce unexpectedly harsh and unjust results.20 5
Along with the option to "go bare," the Florida Financial Responsi-
200. Geiger III, 523 U.S. at 64 (rejecting patient's argument that as a policy matter all medical
malpractice debts of uninsured physicians should be excepted from discharge).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (2010). This section excepts from discharge debts "for death or
personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such
operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another
substance." Id.
202. N. Miami Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Miller, 896 So. 2d 886, 888 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(describing the legislative policy of section 458.320(5)(g)).
203. Mary Coombs, How Not To Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 18
HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 373 (2008).
204. H.R. 665C1, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/datal
session/2005/House/bills/billtext/pdf/h066501cl.pdf; S. 972, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2005/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0972.pdf.
205. Another major repercussion of section 458.320(5)(g) is that injured patients lack the
incentive to bring a case against a physician who is "bare." Kachalia, supra note 3, at 420;
Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH & LEE L. REv. 603, 621 (2006); GAO
REPORT, supra note 18, at 41-42 (explaining how damage caps reduce incentive for attorneys to
take on medical malpractice cases).
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bility statute provides for two other ways for physicians to fulfill finan-
cial responsibility that guarantee remedy for an injured patient without
requiring physicians to pay the high liability insurance premiums. Flor-
ida physicians may satisfy financial responsibility by establishing an
irrevocable letter of credit or maintaining an escrow account specifically
allocated for medical malpractice judgments.20 6 The only cost associated
with establishing an escrow account would be the loss of any investment
income. These options provide the same benefit to physicians of elimi-
nating expensive medical malpractice liability insurance premiums. Yet
these options do not compromise an injured patient's ability to recover.
As long as these comparably affordable self-insurance options exist, sec-
tion 458.320(5)(g) is unnecessary to ensure that physicians have afforda-
ble insurance options to satisfy financial responsibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
A series of cases over the past few decades has severely limited an
injured patient's ability to recover a judgment award or settlement sum
from a "bare" self-insured physician who complies with Florida's Finan-
cial Responsibility statute section 458.320(5)(g). The availability of
bankruptcy protection-including broad exemption guidelines and
homestead rules in Florida-and the bankruptcy court's hands-off
approach to the Financial Responsibility statute are serious roadblocks
for patient recovery. Congress or the Florida Legislature or both should
address the loophole created by section 458.320(5)(g) in the context of
bankruptcy and amend current legislation so that "bare" physician-debt-
ors can no longer discharge medical malpractice debts.
206. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320(2)(b) (West 2004).
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